

# **The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5**

Version 1.0

6 April 2009



This is a Final MNE 5 Document

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>06 APR 2009</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>Final</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE 5</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>USJFCOM J9 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, Suffolk, VA</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT <b>Since the end of the cold war, crises in the international arena have become more complex, involving a multitude of actors and issues. This has necessitated developing a more comprehensive and coordinated way of dealing with these crises and their complexities. The central theme in MNE 5 will be a whole of government or comprehensive approach. This paper seeks to define and describe the Comprehensive Approach concept with particular reference to the management of international crises involving stabilization and reconstruction (S&amp;R) efforts. The purpose is to describe a conceptual approach to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of international crises.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS <b>multinational, experiment, MNE, comprehensive approach, whole of government, concerted planning and action, unified action, unity of effort, strategic planning, operational planning, information sharing, knowledge development, information strategy, information operations, effects-based operations, multinational logistics</b>					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UU</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>21</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

**Preface:**

This paper seeks to define and describe the Comprehensive Approach concept with particular reference to the management of international crises involving stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts. The purpose is to describe a conceptual approach to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of international crises. It will also provide the overarching framework for Multinational Experiment 5.

**Background:**

Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) is the fifth in a series of experiments conducted by a core group of multinational experimentation partners. A multi-year effort, MNE 5 will conduct narrowly focused events in FY 08 and a capstone major integrating event in spring 09. A disciplined experimentation campaign plan has been developed so that experiment issues and expected deliverables drive individual workshops, and limited objective experiments. Improvements to deliverables (processes, organizational structures, and technologies) are distributed as they are developed throughout the experimentation campaign. The MNE 5 community of interest membership currently includes 17 nations, NATO and the European Union. Specifically: Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) are partner/participants. The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Singapore, South Korea and the European Union will observe the events. Japan has most recently requested to observe this campaign and is being considered at this time.

The multinational experiment process began in 2001 in an effort to develop better ways to plan and conduct coalition operations. Since the first experiment in November 2001, the process has developed numerous structures, processes and tools which will make future multinational engagement in crisis interventions more effective and efficient.

Since the end of the cold war, crises in the international arena have become more complex, involving a multitude of actors and issues. This has necessitated developing a more comprehensive and coordinated way of dealing with these crises and their complexities. The central theme in MNE 5 will be a “whole of government” or “comprehensive” approach. By using a combination of national and international elements of power and influence to mitigate a hypothetical crisis in a regional environment (West Africa), those nations and organizations involved in MNE 5 will seek to broaden their understanding of pre-crisis analysis and planning, strategic policy development and planning, and operational planning, management and evaluation of performance and effectiveness. A primary goal is to develop capabilities for effective, day-to-day involvement across agencies and nations and organizations in order to support crisis planning and action. A discussion of the major challenges which form the context for MNE5 is contained in Annex A.

**Context:**

The world of the 21st Century is complex and interdependent. International crises brought about by intra or inter state conflict, failed or failing states, transnational terrorism, natural causes such as drought or famine, or natural disasters pose challenges that require a coordinated, coherent response from the international community. Over the past 15 years, the number and scope of international crisis management operations have increased dramatically. In response, crisis management operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to include peace enforcement and maintenance, “nation building”, and large-scale civilian and military operations. Also, the number of different crisis management actors has multiplied. Today the crisis management community consists of multiple actors including governments, international organizations (IO), private companies and non-governmental organizations (NGO) which often represent different sectors - security, political, economic, humanitarian etc. – frequently with divergent missions, agendas, and asymmetric resources.

The complex nature of the crises, often involving states with governance, rule of law or physical infrastructures least able to handle the challenges posed, as well as the multitude of crisis management actors calls for a comprehensive international response that includes a multidimensional strategy involving a “whole of government” approach within and across national governments, coupled with collaboration with International Organizations/ intergovernmental organizations (IGO), Non-Governmental Organizations, and the private sector.

Intergovernmental organizations like the European Union (EU) have also recognized this complex interdependency, noting that complex crises demand a comprehensive response including a mixture of instruments and actors. In failed states for example, military instruments may be needed to restore order alongside humanitarian efforts to manage the immediate crisis. In the post conflict phase, military assets and effective policing may be needed in conjunction with political, humanitarian and development actors.

In most circumstances, no single agency, government, or organization will be able to accomplish its own goals without the support of the others. Natural disasters, such as the tsunami off the coast of Indonesia in 2004 or hurricane Katrina along the southern coast of the U.S. may require the assets and capabilities of both military and civilian agencies. Neither civilian agencies nor military forces alone have the capability to deal adequately with natural disasters of such magnitude. Further, crises involving intra or inter state conflict present an even more compelling case for a comprehensive, coordinated response. The resolution of conflict will no longer be defined simply by military victory, but by success in stabilization and reconstruction. Coordinated civil-military efforts must begin in the pre-conflict analysis and planning stages and continue through the management and evaluation of operations, and “success” will need to be defined at the beginning and refined throughout the process.

Successful interventions will require increased interdependency among government, civilian and military agencies, as well as with international organizations, non-

governmental organizations, the private sector, and especially the early and continual involvement of the institutions of the state(s) experiencing the conflict or the victim(s) of the natural disaster. Failure to craft a realistic strategy in advance, along with the structures to link the elements necessary to achieve success, will undermine the harmonization of effort required, and threaten the timely achievement of objectives.

### **Definitions:**

Many nations have come to the realization that a comprehensive approach is indispensable to effective performance and success in crisis interventions. Each has developed their own unique approach and definition. Despite some differences, it is noteworthy that all underscore the importance of unity of effort, early and continuous collaboration. It is useful to review some of their approaches and formulations.

Canada acknowledges the complex nature of international crises, and recognizes the need for a coordinated, “whole of government” approach at the national and international level. To accomplish this, Canada has created the Stability and Reconstruction Task Force (START), whose mission is to ensure timely, coordinated responses to international crisis, using a “whole of government” approach, and to deliver coherent conflict prevention, crisis response...and stabilization initiatives in states in transition.

Denmark has adopted a similar approach. The Danish initiative known as Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations, or CPA, is a national multilateral approach for civil and military activities working towards the goal of stabilization and normalization of living conditions in a coordinated manner.

In practice this means “... coordination of *all* civilian, including political, economic and legal elements, and military efforts during all phases of an operation. Not only in the operation area but also in the capital to ensure the maximum effect of the resources allocated to the area”. It is noteworthy that Denmark includes its national NGOs in its planning and action concept.

The European Union has also endorsed the comprehensive approach concept and applied it to strategic and operational planning. The purpose of its concept is to define a practical framework for effective planning coordination between EU actors for EU crisis management in accordance with the agreed EU Crisis Management Procedures. This planning approach enhances the possibility for the EU to address complex crises in a coherent manner. It takes into account relevant EU planning and crisis response instruments and Council instances, at all levels in order to achieve synergy and focus.

Germany uses a comprehensive concept on civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building. The key elements of this concept are

- The integration of crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building
- A comprehensive political strategy which is coordinated at the national and international level, and which integrates the instruments from the foreign policy, security, development, financial, economic, cultural and legal policy fields

- Careful coordination between military and civilian actors
- Involvement of non-state (NGO, business, religious groups) as much as possible.

NATO has also endorsed the need for a comprehensive approach. Experience from NATO operations has demonstrated to Allies that coordination between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. At the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO Allies agreed that a comprehensive approach engaging all these actors was required to meet the challenges of operational environments such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The summit further tasked relevant entities to begin work on elaborating an action plan for how the Alliance could incorporate a comprehensive approach. A report on the progress is expected at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.

NATO understands that it needs to ensure that its own planning and crisis management procedures are coherently applied and that it is able to cooperate with a range of partners for example, the United Nations (UN), EU, NGOs and local actors, in the planning and conduct of operations. It also needs to convince other actors that, in seeking such co-operation with them, it is not trying to claim any leadership role over them: that would be inappropriate and counter productive.

The United Kingdom postulates that the realization of national strategic objectives inevitably relies on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a customized, agile and sensitive influence and information effort. In seeking to strengthen and hasten the formation of these partnerships within an institutional framework and in support of collective decision-making, a comprehensive approach could help encourage, at the earliest possible opportunity, the forestalling, containment or permanent resolution of crises.

For the United States, a recently approved interagency management system for reconstruction and stabilization activities includes a **Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group** (CRSG) which would serve as the central coordinating body for the United States Government (USG) effort. This group would prepare the whole-of-government strategic plan. The plan will include a common USG strategic goal, a concept of operations, the major essential tasks the USG must undertake, including those with international partners, and resource requirements to achieve stability.

For the US national experiment, Unified Action 2007, (UA07) the comprehensive approach is defined as “the synergistic application of instruments of defense, development, and diplomacy carried out by a wide range of military and nonmilitary actors – civilian government departments and agencies, military forces, and multinational partners including host nations, in collaboration with multilateral organizations (IGOs/IOs), NGOs, and the private sector – for the purpose of achieving viable peace.”<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Viable Peace: Unified Action advocates continuing engagement of the international community well beyond the end of violent conflict. One key goal is the attainment of “viable

The United Nations, while not specifically using the term “comprehensive approach”, outlines its approach to resolving complex crises using very similar language to the preceding formulations. Recognizing the complexity of the operational environment, it acknowledges that “...an integrated UN approach is essential to generate the requisite unity of effort.”

Some of its principles include:

- Coherence in UN response to realize full range of organizational mandates
- Utilization of system-wide competence, expertise and assets most effectively and efficiently
- Employment of a common strategic approach and joint planning.

### **MNE5 Operational Definition**

In the context of Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5), the term “Comprehensive Approach” will be used in a broad sense to describe the wide scope of actions undertaken in a *coordinated and collaborative manner with the affected nation(s)* by national and multinational civilian government agencies and possibly, military forces, international and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to achieve greater harmonization in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of actions required to prevent, ameliorate, mitigate and/or resolve the conditions precipitating the crisis.

### **The Concept:**

As previously noted, given the complexity and interdependency of actors and nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is necessary to achieve greater harmonization among all appropriate actors in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies. In support of this goal, a wide scope of coordinated and collaborative actions may be undertaken between partner organizations. The Comprehensive Approach conceptual framework is applicable from pre-crisis situations to post-conflict reconstruction and through the transition of responsibility to local authorities.

In all stages, the focus of an intervention should be on developing, supporting and sustaining the existing indigenous governance, rule of law and social well-being capacities through the use of all available instruments (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, economic, etc.). To that end, it is imperative that the needs and capacities of the host/beneficiary or target nation are kept in the forefront throughout the planning and management of the operation, and where feasible, the host nation participates in the process. Efforts to analyze the environment and assess implementation planning

---

peace,” defined as “the decisive turning point in the transformation of conflict from imposed stability to self-sustaining peace.”

progress must give primary consideration to how the situation is viewed from the perspective of the host/beneficiary nation.

Shared strategic guidance must be in place to ensure that the desirable early cooperation or collaboration between civilian and military organizations is working toward the agreed goals.

In order to increase cooperation between civilian and military organizations, respect for differences in organizational and operational cultures is crucial. This respect will help build better understanding between organizations. Familiarity and trust in personal relationships will be important, but the ultimate goal is to institutionalize this cooperation in order to achieve greater unity of effort. “Campaign authority” of one actor is dependent on other actors’ perceptions of legitimacy.

There is an intricate relationship between inclusiveness and leadership. The broader the range of actors in consensus-based consultation and coordination mechanisms, the more difficult is the demand on leadership. Moreover, a comprehensive approach is time-consuming and may work against needs for fast decision-making.

From the EU perspective, some methods to improve the cross-agency coordination might include: an enhanced role for the EU Special Representative (EUSR) with a dedicated staff to support him; co-location of in-theatre headquarters; and joint and comprehensive pre-deployment training. These methods can be generalized to many types of missions, and civil-military relationships.

More work is needed on terminology. Terms such as leadership, integration, coordination and cooperation carry different connotations and imply different levels of action and ambition. A “comprehensive approach template” is neither possible nor desirable. A comprehensive approach will rather be a flexible amalgam of different approaches – a way of thinking or a method rather than a mechanical process. Interdependence between comprehensive approaches on the national and international levels is a sought after goal. More coherent national approaches could facilitate a better coherence of multilateral responses and vice versa.

Compatible approaches to analysis, planning, management, and evaluation across organizations will be required. In addition, flexibility will be necessary and analysis, planning, management, and evaluation should be tailored to the organizations involved and the situation on the ground.

#### **Basic Principles for a Comprehensive Approach Reconstruction and Stabilization:**

Different countries, organizations and authors have espoused various principles of a comprehensive approach. While there are different emphases and nuances depending on the organization or author, there are general themes or principles that are found throughout. Following is a summary of these overarching principles:



- **Unity of Effort:** Stabilization and reconstruction operations should be viewed and planned through a whole-of-government process that begins with a shared situation assessment to define an overarching strategic goal.
- **Ownership:** Build on the leadership, participation and commitment of a country and its people. The people of the country in question must view the stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) process as belonging to them and conducted for them. They must be the focus and its primary movers – they hold the ultimate responsibility for the achievement of a viable peace and stable economy.
- **Build Local Capacity:** Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills and promote appropriate policies. From the earliest stage, interventions must emphasize (re)building capacity—public and private, national and local to mitigate and manage drivers of conflict and/or instability.
- **Recognize the Political-Security-Development Nexus:** The political, security, economic, and social spheres are interdependent. Failure in one domain risks failure in all others. International actors and the host nation must balance progress between the interdependent domains in both policy formation and execution.
- **Show Results Quickly but Stay Engaged to Build Capacity:** Experience demonstrates that without short-term, visible impact results, stabilization and reconstruction environment is likely to continue to deteriorate. Those living in post-conflict states cope with instability, conflict, and uncertainty. Short-term measures are critical to meeting their immediate needs and promoting an environment of security, but these measures need to be linked to a longer-term strategy and commitment.
- **Flexibility - Learn and Adapt:** Agencies must be adaptable in order to anticipate possible problems and to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. Analysis and action must be calibrated to the particular circumstances of the country, sometimes to particular regions within countries. Integrated planning and operations should begin with a shared assessment of the drivers and dynamics of conflict and/or instability, and include theories of change.
- **Move from Reaction to Prevention:** Action today can reduce the risk of future outbreaks of conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security.
- **Mix and Sequence National Instruments of Power to Fit the Context:** Conflicted and unstable states require a mix of programmatic and policy responses from the diplomatic, development and defense communities that include foreign assistance; policy dialogue; military assistance or use of force; economic and financial programs and negotiations; and development and implementation of a strategic communications plan.

- **Match Goals and Resources:** A frequent cause of mission failure in crisis intervention operations is lofty goals with insufficient resources to achieve them. The scope of stabilization and reconstruction operations tends to expand as additional needs are identified, so the costs, both in human and financial terms, can escalate far beyond initial expectations.
- **Focus on Addressing the Sources of Conflict and Instability:** To the extent possible, plans and programs in S&R environments should focus on directly diminishing drivers of conflict and instability (rather than just the mitigation of the symptoms) while building up local institutional capacity to effectively address conflict and instability in a transparent, responsive and enduring manner.

These basic principles should be guided by a set of *Implementing Principles* as follows:

- A comprehensive approach to strategy design and planning is a civilian-led process by which national governments define their strategic objectives and rationale, integrate with partners and collaborate with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to achieve coherency.
- This approach seeks to implement a whole of government approach to international operations via early and high involvement by both national and multinational civilian and military communities.
- This process must include an active dialogue and information sharing with international organizations and nongovernmental communities.
- The needs and concerns of the host nation must be considered and reflected in this dialogue.
- Civilian agencies and departments add the most value by leading the strategy development process.
- Early civilian leadership/involvement at a high level is necessary to enable whole of government solutions to guide related planning efforts.
- An agile and flexible planning process is essential to enable adaptation to adaptive actors and environments that are characterized by high levels of continuous *ambiguity* and *uncertainty*.
- An active (multinational) civilian agency, military agency, NGO and IO dialogue is essential from the outset to ensure buy in from stakeholders, and so that the strategic design shapes realistic expectations and sustained effort throughout the design-planning-execution-assessment cycles.

- Specific effort needed to develop a hybrid method/process to dock military campaign planning with civilian planning.

### **Role of Information Sharing:**

Underlying all of these principles is a new approach to information sharing. Crisis management activities in a conflict region span over a host of different actors from organizational units and networks of organizations to private companies and interest groups. Their activities both exploit and create information that is supplied for and acquired by them. Often the information needed for the execution of the activities - especially for the management and decision-making - does not meet the requirements. To enable effective action, information should flow smoothly, both internally in an organization and collaboratively between organizations. To succeed, the actors must have situational awareness and understanding. This can be achieved by using advanced technical systems combined with human analysis.

Crisis management involves activities performed on several organizational levels. Information is delivered and retrieved on each level and between them. The main levels include the policy-strategic that guides the operational-theatre level which again reports back to the policy-strategic level. However, as crisis management activities are implemented and managed by a variety of actors, there is not any one strategic-level actor that can manage all actors on the operational level by implementing a classic command and control approach. The ideal, albeit often unattainable, is that the operational level activities are self-synchronizing. This aims at an optimal use of resources in the specific context. One of the prerequisites for a successful self-synchronization is a high quality of information and shared situational awareness. This means shared understanding in the crisis management community about the situation, capability and plausible futures.

Typically, the organizational structure of actors in crisis management is not designed for collaboration and smooth information sharing. Instead, organizations are often structured to reflect their vision, mission and activities. The salience of appropriate situational understanding and information management in today's international crisis management thus poses challenges also to the organizational structure of the actors.

### **Refining the Comprehensive Approach: The Output**

As described in Annex A, Multinational Experiment 5 is comprised of several focus areas which will be developed by workshops, limited objective experiments, and major integrating events. A capstone or cumulating integration event will be held in 2009. This paper will be informed and refined through these events, as well as from lessons from real-world applications of a comprehensive approach to crisis management. The objective of this process is to produce a set of guidelines for applying a comprehensive approach to international crisis management.

### **MNE5 and the Comprehensive Approach: Postscript**

Following the completion of the first two major integrating events (MIE), Strategic Planning and Implementation Planning, the MNE 5 leadership participated in a Comprehensive Approach Seminar hosted by Finland and sponsored by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). It is noteworthy that CMI was founded, and is still led, by Dr. Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland and recipient of the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize. Findings and observations from the first two integrating events were presented as part of the Comprehensive Approach Seminar<sup>2</sup>.

Immediately following the Comprehensive Approach Seminar, the MNE 5 Executive Board met and reviewed the Finnish-hosted Comprehensive Approach Seminar (CAS) held the previous day. Based on the CAS discussions, the Board endorsed the Comprehensive Approach and agreed that the MNE 5 Comprehensive Approach products were sufficiently developed to be implemented or integrated into various international and national organizations and processes. During the discussion, the Board concluded that MNE experimentation on the Comprehensive Approach would reach culmination under MNE 5 and should be transitioned to nations and organizations for implementation.

The Board agreed with the CAS finding that MNE 5 was a success and that the MNE community remained a uniquely valuable forum. The Board committed itself to maintaining the momentum of multinational experimentation.

As noted in this paper, several national and international organizations have endorsed and adopted the whole of government or comprehensive approach to international crisis management. As this concept and its associated principles, structures, processes and tools are applied to real-world crises, the lessons learned from these will further shape both the concept and its application.

---

<sup>2</sup> Seminar Publication on the Comprehensive Approach; Published by: **Ministry of Defence**  
P.O.BOX 31, 00131 Helsinki Finland

Annex A

**Multinational Experiment 5: The Challenges**

There are numerous challenges that hamper the achievement of the goals of the Comprehensive Approach conceptual framework. Several of these challenges are listed below along with references to the types of solutions that will be developed for experimentation during the MNE5 campaign. The numbering of the challenges is not intended to imply priority or relative importance.

1. It is often difficult to craft agreed and achievable guidance at the strategic level, particularly in a coalition environment. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily process-oriented.
2. The maintenance of a reactive approach to a crisis vice a preventative and proactive approach hampers a nation's or coalition's ability to intervene early to prevent the crisis, particularly when time is required to build a coalition. While a preventative approach is desirable, few organizations have the financial resources to maintain standby capabilities to respond to complex emergencies. A related challenge at the national level is remaining patient with long-term goals (e.g. development) while reacting to short-term goals (e.g. crises) at the same time. Often, crises will draw considerable resources away from long-term development efforts, thereby slowing or stopping their progress. (Detailed investigation to be conducted in Unified Action series.)
3. In a multinational context, there is no internationally agreed approach for determining when an intervention is necessary. There is also not an agreed method for the development of approaches to transitioning into and out of complex emergencies. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily organization and process-oriented.
4. Government and non-government agency and organization approaches are not compatible enough to ensure unity of effort in planning for interventions. This challenge addresses improving interagency coordination and understanding inter-organizational cultures and practices
5. Government and non-government agency approaches are not compatible enough to ensure unity of effort during the management of interventions. This challenge addresses improving interagency coordination structures and understanding inter-organizational cultures and practices. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily organization and process-oriented.
6. A common challenge for civilian and military organizations is the measurement of results on the ground and evaluation or assessment of progress toward goals. Many organizations lack sufficient internal methods to evaluate how their plans are progressing, thereby making it even more difficult to implement shared multi-

organization solutions. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily process, organization, and technology-oriented.

7. Although military forces are capable of providing interim security and the permissive environment necessary to support civilian operations, such forces are not always properly trained, equipped, or resourced for long-term stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Further, civilian agencies sometimes lack the expedient funding mechanisms and “surge” capacity to conduct the short-term extensive stabilization and reconstruction tasks required in a crisis intervention. (Detailed investigation to be conducted in Unified Action series.)
8. Information sharing among nations, organizations, and agencies is currently insufficient to support a Comprehensive Approach. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily policy, process, organization, and technology-oriented.
9. In theaters of operations, shared understanding of the operational environment among nations, organizations, and agencies is currently insufficient to support synergistic collaboration and interaction. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily policy, security, process, organization, and technology-oriented.
10. Designing and implementing guidance for coalition actions to affect information and information systems (information activities) is a challenge that applies to the whole scope of civil-military efforts from pre-crisis situations to post-conflict reconstructions, and spans all levels of involvement. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily policy, organization, and process-oriented.
11. At all levels, the needs and capacities of the nation(s)/regions of interest where operations are happening need to be taken into account. MNE5 products and solutions related to this challenge will be primarily process and organization-oriented.

### **Meeting the Challenges: Applying the Comprehensive Approach**

The problem statement for MNE 5 is: “Coalition partners require improved methods to conduct rapid interagency and multinational planning, coordination, and execution in order to create and carry out a unified comprehensive strategy.”

The overarching conceptual framework for MNE 5 is called “The Comprehensive Approach.” In the context of MNE 5, the term Comprehensive Approach will be used in a broad generic sense to describe the wide scope of actions undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner by national and multinational civilian government agencies and military forces, in coordination with international and intergovernmental organizations

(IOs/IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to achieve greater coherence and harmonization in the planning, execution and assessment of coalition interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies.

The MNE5 national directors, with the concurrence of the MNE5 Executive Board, have identified ten focus areas for detailed examination and development. These areas, together with the country leading development are:

- Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning (FRA)
- Cooperative Implementation Planning (GBR)
- Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation (USA)
- Knowledge Development (DEU)
- Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (SWE)
- Shared Information Framework and Technology (FIN)
- Coalition Information Strategy/Information Operations (DEU)
- Effects Based Approach to Multinational Operations-EBAO (NATO)
- Multinational Effects Based Assessment-EBA (NATO)
- Multinational Logistics (USA)

Two other areas of special interest are medical (USA) and maritime situational awareness (NATO-FIN). These will be considered but may not be specifically integrated into MNE5 major integrating events.

The primary focus areas are strategic planning, implementation planning and management and evaluation. The other focus areas are considered enabling concepts and will be developed in support of the primary focus areas.

Each of the focus areas is applying the comprehensive approach, either explicitly or implicitly, to their internal experimental processes and concept development. The results of the MNE5 integrating events will provide more insights into the practical implementation of the comprehensive approach, leading, possibly, to a handbook of basic principles. Following are brief descriptions of each of the concepts and its contribution to the comprehensive approach.

### **Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning (FRA)**

Since the end of the Cold War most crises and complex emergencies have been dealt with by coalitions rather than a single nation. Following the identification of an unsatisfactory or deteriorating situation in a country or region by one or more nations who have a common interest in collaborating to manage the problem(s) in the area in question, bi-lateral or multilateral discussions usually results. Strategic planning then occurs in each of the concerned nations and organizations, followed by multilateral discussion to attempt to reconcile the strategic plans. For MNE5, The multinational interagency strategic planning process is an attempt to collaboratively develop a shared assessment and a jointly developed strategic plan with a set of key objectives and end state(s). In this

process, an expected product is a set of guidelines for national policy makers and strategic planners to assist in developing shared assessments of the problem(s), and a strategy to deal with the crisis, including establishing strategic objectives and a strategic end state.

The development of a shared assessment is a critical first step in defining a multinational strategic policy. As the development of this process for achieving a shared assessment has not been defined as a separate area of exploration for MNE5, it will be included in a limited manner in the multinational strategic planning endeavor.

For MNE5, this process will draw on national assessments individually compiled according to unique national processes. Then a multinational interagency group of representatives from different national agencies and cultures, and different fields of expertise and backgrounds, will meet to share their assessments, and develop a shared understanding and identification of the commonalities of objectives. Following the development of this shared assessment, a collaborative multinational strategic plan will be developed.

The first limited objective experiment will focus on the development and refinement of the strategic planning guide (SPG). The second limited objective experiment will focus on the conduct of a multinational shared assessment, the development of a strategic plan to include strategic objectives and end state, and broad allocations of responsibilities. The product of this event will be a strategic level guidance document.

### **Cooperative Implementation Planning (GBR)**

The aim of cooperative implementation planning is to develop a process and structure for conducting comprehensive multinational implementation planning in support of a crisis intervention. The objectives of this process are:

- To develop a country-level, multi-national and inter-agency ‘campaign plan’ that identifies the conditions that are to be achieved the priority for achieving them and the lead agencies responsible for delivering them.
- To oversee the further development of this campaign plan into coherent activity plans to address these effects.
- To monitor the implementation of the campaign and subordinate activity plans.
- To review progress against the campaign plan and adjust it as required.
- To provide a reporting mechanism to the strategic level and national capitals.
- To support the continual development of the overall strategy through the provision of specialist advice in response to requests for information.

The expected product of the CIP process in MNE5 will be a set of guidelines for the structure and process of implementation planning in support of crisis intervention.



### **Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation (USA)**

In support of the comprehensive approach the objectives of the Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation focus area are as follows:

- Develop method(s) to improve compatibility among the execution approaches of various interagency and multinational organizations to facilitate coordinated implementation management during interventions.
- Develop method(s) to achieve improved cooperation at the strategic and operational levels between a coalition and relevant international organizations during the execution of an operation.
- Develop method(s) to better understand non-governmental organization capabilities and better coordinate our efforts with theirs during crisis interventions.
- Develop method(s) to measure results and use those measurements at the operational and strategic levels to evaluate progress toward achieving the desired end state.
- Develop method(s) to improve compatibility among the evaluation approaches of various interagency and multinational organizations.

### **Knowledge Development (DEU)**

Knowledge Development seeks to support a comprehensive approach in a multinational and interagency context by providing integrated methods, processes, organization and technologies to help commanders or mission directors and their staffs, and external partners, civilian and military, to gain a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the operational environment.

The Knowledge Development process

- contributes to all the staff activities
- utilizes linkages between national and multinational partners and agencies, centers of excellence, subject matter experts and the integrated mission staff to seek out and access all available sources of information, knowledge and expertise
- contributes to a multinational knowledge base that contains all the information necessary for a systems analysis
- facilitates a broad, more interconnected view of the operational environment

### **Information Exchange Architecture and Technology (SWE)**

This focus area applies technical solutions to support a comprehensive approach. It seeks to:

- Deliver a Service Oriented technical architecture that will guide design and implementation of technical systems (services, information, tools, network, etc).
  - \* Support CONOPS documented using NATO Architecture Framework v 3 concepts.
  - \* Architecture definition and design thru use of Design Rules.

- Provide Service Oriented integration platform.
- Include Security solution – technical design.
  - \* Provide a technical security design solution for a SOA environment that will guide implementation of technical systems (tools, network, etc).

### **Shared Information Framework and Technology (FIN)**

Today the crisis management community consists of many different entities and groups with divergent missions, resources and agendas. Implementing a comprehensive approach suggests the need for developing a structure and process for information sharing among these diverse groups. The Shared Information Framework and Technology (SHIFT) suggests an approach to improve information sharing among crisis prevention and response communities. The aim of SHIFT is to promote the use of a common and neutral information sharing platform rather than bilateral information exchange arrangements. The general goal is to create a safer environment, to avoid duplicating and conflicting efforts, and to try to develop a coordinated approach to managing the crisis in the field.

SHIFT will be used in Multinational Experiment 5 to experiment with information flows among all participating actors in the field, of which potential SHIFT users might include individuals from governmental entities, civilian and military; international organizations; non governmental organizations; private companies and contractors; host nation institutions; and other actors.

### **Coalition Information Strategy / Information Operations (DEU)**

In both modern information societies as well as less developed ones, the information factor has evolved to become a significant element of security-related capabilities and is critical to all areas of activity, as every action may affect the information environment and vice versa. Understanding the strategic environment is the most essential prerequisite for crisis/conflict prevention and resolution, and yet, inadequate analysis of the information environment is perhaps the most common error made. Effective and efficient actions require the integrated application of all areas of activity, and the continuous consideration of the information factor throughout all related processes – analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation. Extensive experience with international crisis management, whether humanitarian relief or stabilization operations, has shown the importance of a comprehensive information strategy.

For MNE5, a consideration of a comprehensive information strategy will be included in the major focus area events. The objective of this focus area is to develop an integrated concept that describes methods to enable and promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military, governmental, and non-governmental) in the information environment. This includes the development and implementation of strategic and political guidance for interagency information activities; the harmonization of information activities among coalition partners (considering national caveats, legal restrictions, and unique cultural/political attributes); and the determination of related information sharing requirements.

The Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) is a German-led multinational effort focused on delivering three major products: 1) a conceptual framework (policy level) for multinational information activities in a comprehensive and interagency context; 2) a draft concept (doctrine level) for the development and implementation of a Coalition Information Strategy; 3) a draft concept (doctrine level) for the implementation of a Coalition Information Strategy in the military (Information Operations).

### **Effects Based Approach to Multinational Operations-EBAO (NATO)**

The Effects-Based Approach to Multinational Operations (EBAO) seeks to harmonize military and civilian activities in order to influence the overall behavior of other actors – national and transnational, belligerent and benign - in an operational environment. Its application allows the planning, execution, and assessment of those activities to be based on a holistic and dynamic understanding of the actors in that environment.

EBAO is designed to provide military organizations the ability to, with their civilian partners, better focus on a shared desired end state, the specific behaviors on the parts of other actors in the environment that would make that end state possible, and the specific “effects” that would facilitate those behaviors. The treatment of these effects (understood as intermediate system states on the way to the end state) in planning, execution, and assessment is what makes an operation essentially effects-based. The resulting benefits are a set of *actions that are explicitly linked by effects to a desired end state*, coherently *harmonized with those of other governmental organizations*, and made *adaptive within the course of their execution by effective assessment*.

### **Multinational Effects Based Assessment-EBA (NATO)**

Effects-based plans are not presumed to be foolproof; during their execution they will require continuous assessment and informed adjustments. In EBA, progress toward the accomplishment of actions, the creation of effects, and the attainment of the end state are all assessed. The three are first assessed independently and then compared in order to examine the causality relationships between actions and effects and then effects and the end state. Consistent with that theme, it is vital to note that *application of the effects-based approach presumes adaptiveness, not predictiveness*. The assessment of progress as well as the evaluation of causality requires close cooperation with civilian partners. The primary goal of Assessment during an Effects-Based approach is to provide the military commander an evaluation of progress toward the desired End State, Military Objective(s), and Effects. This is accomplished by evaluating system states, comparing the current system state with the desired system state, providing input as required to guide execution or plan revision.

### **Multinational Logistics (USA)**

Lessons learned from numerous recent humanitarian relief operations emphasized the need for a comprehensive and multinational operational level logistics concept of operations (CONOPs) which describes how the military synchronizes planning and execution of logistics within a civilian led comprehensive (whole of government) approach. Extensive pre-deployment planning is required to identify and ready forces for deployment and to ensure the most efficient and effective use of very limited assets. In MNE 5 the Logistics Focus Area seeks to develop a CONOPs which clearly describes the roles and responsibilities of the military logisticians and their supporting processes, organizations and tools, and how they can support/augment civilian operations.

## Bibliography

Denmark. *Chairman's Report, Seminar on Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations*. Copenhagen. June 2005.

Eide, Espen Barth. Ministry of Defence, Norway. *From peacekeeping to peacebuilding*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. <http://www.norway-nato.org/news/290506.htm>. 29 May 2006.

European Union Political-Military Group Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning 3 November 2005

Finland Ministry of Defense, *SHIFT Concept* Draft Version 0.1; 18 March 07

Finland Ministry of Defense, *Seminar Publication on the Comprehensive Approach*; 2008

Germany Die Bundesregierung. *Action Plan, Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*. Berlin. 12 May 2004.

Institute for Defense Analyses. *A Snapshot of Emerging US Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies*. Alexandria, Virginia. May 2006.

Institute for Defense Analysis. *Emerging Interagency Doctrine for Interventions*. Alexandria, Virginia. 4 January 2006.

Metcalf, Andrew. *Implementing a Whole of Government Approach to National Security and Terrorism*. Speech to the National Security Australia Conference. [www.pmc.gov.au/speeches/metcalf/whole\\_govt\\_approach\\_2004-03-04.cfm](http://www.pmc.gov.au/speeches/metcalf/whole_govt_approach_2004-03-04.cfm). 23 March 2004.

Pettigrew, Pierre. *Implementation of Canada's International Policy Statement*. Notes for an address by the Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication\\_id=383350&language=E7](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=383350&language=E7). November 2005.

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. Joint Discussion Note 4/05, *The Comprehensive Approach*. Swindon. January 2006.

United States. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. Washington, DC. 7 December 2005.

United States Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology (US-CREST). *Coalition Stability Operations Project Phase I Final Report*. Arlington, Virginia. August 2006.

United States Department of Defense and Department of State. United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet Version 1.0, *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*. Norfolk, Virginia. 1 December 2005.

United States Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05. *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. Washington, DC. 28 November 2005.

United States Department of Defense. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Washington, DC. 10 July 2001.

United States Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-08, Volumes 1 and 2, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*. Washington, DC. 17 March 2006.

United States Department of Defense. *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.9*. Suffolk, Virginia. June 2006.

United States Department of Defense United States Joint Forces Command. *Military Support to Unified Action, Framework for a White Paper*. Suffolk, Virginia. January 2006.

United States Department of Defense United States Joint Forces Command. *Shaping Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Concept Proposal*. Suffolk, Virginia. 7 June 2006.

United States Department of Defense United States Joint Forces Command. *Unified Action Fact Sheet*. Suffolk, Virginia. July 2006.

United States Department of State. *Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operation*. A Guide for United States Government Planners. Washington, DC. April 2006.

United States Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Army FM 3-24 (draft), Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC. June 2006.